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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant.
[L. A. No. 23656.
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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant.
WIRE MOUNTAIN HOMES, INC. NO.1 (a Corporation),
Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant.
WIRE MOUNTAIN HOMES, INC. NO.2 (a Corporation),
Respondent, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant.

)

[1] Taxation-Assessment-PropeIty Escaping Assessment.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, § 531, when property is not assessed
between the first Mondays in March and July for any tax
year, the assessor is required to assess it when he discovers
its physical existence, its taxable status, or the fact that it
has not been assessed.
[2] Id.-Assessment-Property Escaping Assessment.-Only if a
delayed assessment were caused by the assessor's negligence
and would cause substantial injury to the taxpayer might
such assessment be improper.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 161; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 734McK. Dig. References: [1 2, 5] Taxation, § 147; [3] Taxation,
§ 199(1); L4, 16] Taxation, § 208; [6-8, 14] Taxation, § 183;
[9, 21-23, 25, 26, 28-31, 34, 35] Taxation, § 191; [10] Taxation,
§§ 53, 55, 60; [11] Taxation, § 60; [12] Taxation, § 57; [13, 33]
Taxation, § 189; [15, 17-20, 27] Taxation, § 186; [24, 32] Taxation, § 187.
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[3] Id. - Equalization - Proceedings of Local Board - Notice.Where a taxpayer appeared before the county board of equalization and requested that a Jl.Ossessory interest in tax exempt
land, which was not assessed during the regular assessment
period, be assessed at the figures which the taxpayer supplied,
but the assessor opposed the petition and the board authorized
the assessor to enter an assessment as soon as he secured sufficient information, such authorization was properly granted,
notwithstanding that it was not preceded by five days' notice
as required by Rev. & Tax. Code, § 1611, since the matter was
"investigated" within the meaning of such statute when both
the taxpayer and the assessor appeared before the board and
argued, respectively, that an immediate assessment should be
made and that assessment should be delayed, and they may
not thereafter complain that they did not receive five days'
notice of the meeting.
[4] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Board-Review.Where the county board of equalization could have concluded
that the assessor did not have sufficient information to make
an assessment up to the time of a hearing before the board,
and where there is no evidence that the board acted arbitrarily
or abused its discretion in authorizing the assessor to enter
an assessment as soon as he secured sufficient information, its
directions to the assessor cannot be set aside.
[6] Id.-Assessment-Property Escaping Assessment.-Where the
assessor, who was authorized by the county board of equalization to enter an assessment as soon as he secured sufficient
information, entered his assessment without further notice to
the taxpayer, and where neither the order of the board nor
any statute required such notice and the assessment was made
in accord with the directions of the board, it was validly
entered on the tax roll.
[6a,6b] Id.-Assessment-Valuation.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 401, declaring that all taxable property shall be assessed
at its "full cash value," the quoted words provide for an
assessment at the price that property would bring to its
owner if it were offered for sale on an open market under
conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other; such standard of valuation
is a measure of desirability translated into money amounts,
and might be called the market value of property for use in
its present condition.
[7] Id.-Assessment-Valuation.-All taxable property must be
assessed at its "full cash value," as prescribed by Rev. &·Tax.
Code, § 401. (Const., art. XIII, § 1.)
[6] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 187; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 696.

548

DE

Luz

HOMES, INC.

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

[45 C.2d

[8] Id.-Assessment--Valuation.-Const., art. XIII, § 1, requires
not only that all nonexempt property be taxed, but that except
as otherwise specified all property be assessed by the same
standard of valuation.
[9]., Id.-Assessment--Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-Since nonexempt possessory interests in land and improvements, such
as leasehold estates, are taxable property, they must be
assessed at "full cash value."

)

)

[10] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property.-In practice, assessors usually enter the entire value of land and improvements on the tax roll without distinction between possessory
and reversionary interests, and since this practice results in
a single amount reflecting both interests on the roll, the
constitutional mandate that all property be taxed is obeyed.
[11] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Possessory Interests.-As between reversioners and possessors payment of the
tax is a private arrangement, but when the possessory interest
is taxable and the reversion is exempt, only the possessory
interest is subject to assessment and taxation.
[12] Id.-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Leaseholds.Where there is a lease of land owned by a pnblic body, the
reversion being exempt from taxation, the usufructuary interest alone is subject to tax in proportion to its value; and
in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the tax necessarily
falls on the lessee.
[13] Id.-Assessment--Valuation-Possessory Interests.-Since a
possessory interest in land must be assessed in accord with
the standard of valuation applicable to all other property,
its estimated value is the price it would bring if offered on an
open market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller
could take advantage of the exigencies of the other, and this
hypothetical market price is its value though a sale of the
property has not been made or contemplated.
[14] Id.-Assessment--Valuation.-The absence of an lI.ctual market for a particular t.ype of property does not mean that it
has no value or that it may escape from the mandate of Const.,
art. XIII. § 1, that all property shall be taxed in proportion
to its value, but only that the assessor must then use snch
pertinent factors as replacement costs and analyses for determining valuation.
[15] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Assessors
generally estimate value by analyzing market data on sales
of similar property, replacement costs and income from the
property, and sinct> no one of these methods alone can be
used to estimate thc value of all property, the assessor, subject
to requirements of fairness and uniformity, may exercise his
discretion in using one or lllOl'e of them.
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[16] Id.-Equalization-Proceedings of Local Board-Review.The assessing authority's estimate of the value of specific
property at a specific time is reviewed by the board of equalization at the taxpayer's request (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 16011615), and the board's decision in regard to specific valuations
and the methods of valuation employed is equivalent to the
findings and judgment of a trial court and is reviewable only
for arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or failure to follow the
standards prescribed by the Legislature.
[17] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-According to the capitalization of income method of valuing property from which income may be or is derived, the value of
the property is the sum of anticipated future installments of
net income from the property, less an allowance for interest
and the risk of partial or no receipt; it involves a capitalization or discounted valuation of the realized or prospective
net monetary income derivable by continuous exploitation
rather than by resale.
[18] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-The first
step in tht: capitalization of income method of valuing property
is to determine prospective net income and this is done by
estimating future gross income and deducting therefrom expected necessary expenses incident to maintenance and operation of the property, and in instances in which future income
cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy or is not
ascribable entirely to the property, prospective net monetary
income is imputed in an amount equal to a minimum reasonable
return on estimated market value.
[19] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-Since it is
generally accepted that a person who agrees to receive payment in the future is entitled to interest both for waiting
and the risk of partial or no receipt, the second step in the
capitalization of income method of valuing property is to
discount each ft.1ture installment of income by a rate of interest
that takes into account the hazards of the investment and
the accepted concepts of a "fair return"; and the sum of the
discounted installments is the present· value of the property.
[20] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-The net
earnings to be capitalized, under the capitalization of income
method of valuing property, are not those of the present owner
of the property, but those that would be anticipated by a
prospective purchaser.
[21] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The standard of "full cash value" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401) applies to
a leasehold interest, and accordingly the assessor must estimate
the price a leasehold would bring on an open market under
conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take advan-
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tage of the exigencies of the other, and he must capitalize,
not the anticipated net earnings of the present lessee, but
those of a prospective assignee.
[22] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-To a prospective assignee of a lease, anticipated net earnings equal
.. expected gross income less necessary expenditures for maintenance, operation and taxes; no deduction is made for the
cost of the lease to the present lessee, i.e., his charges for
rent and amortization of improvements.
[23] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-A person
who has assumed a lease will deduct from his annual income
statement an aliquot portion of the price he paid to acquire
the lease and of the cost of improvements that he installed,
but such practice will not reflect the "full cash value" of
the property for tax assessment purposes.
[24] Id.-Assessment- Valuation-Deductions.-In determining
the income to be capitalized to establish value for appraisal
purposes, no deduction can be made for amortization.
[26] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-Rent paid
for a leasehold interest is part of the cost or purchase price
of the leasehold, and to include a deduction for it is to include
an item of expense based on the value of the property, and
it would not only be anomalous to deduct any part of that
value, the very answer sought, from the income that is to be
capitalized to obtain that answer, it would be a duplication,
since the interest rate applied in capitalizing net income
provides for a return of capital value as well as interest.
[26a,26b] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The
assessor may not be required to deduct the present lessee's
charges for rent and amortization from estimated gross income
when valuing possessory interests by an analysis of anticipated
earning power. (Disapproving L. W. Blinn Lumber 00. v.
Los Angeles Oounty, 216 Cal. 468, 474, 14 P.2d 512.)
[27] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valuation.-In determining the income to be capitalized to establish value for
appraisal purposes, there will be no "waste" of capital when
the purchaser's cost equals the capital value of the property;
if the cost exceeds this value, there is a wastage of capital,
but only at the time of purchase and it is properly disregarded
by persons valuing property in terms of future income.
[28] Id;-Assessment - Valuation - Leasehold Estates.-Though
the value of leaseholds, when no deduction from income is
made for amortization and rent, may approach the estimated
fee values of the land and improvements, near equality between the two estimated values would not of itself demonstrate
invalidity in the valuation of either one.
[29] Id. - Assessment - Valuation - Leasehold Estates. - Near
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equality of leasehold values to those of the fee of tax exempt
land of the federal government does not necessarily constitute
a violation of the immunity of such governmcnt from taxation
by the states; where the tax is imposed solely on the privately
owned possessory interest of the lessee (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 104, 107, 201), and under the terms of the lease will be
paid entirely by the lessee (see 12 U.S.C. § 1748£), neither its
legal nor economic incidence falls on the federal government.
(30] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-In determining the value of leaseholds in tax exempt property of the
federal government, it is erroneous to impute an income of
6 per cent and taxes of 2 per cent to an amount somewhat
less than the estimated fee value of the land and improvements, to deduct from the imputed income the rent paid to the
government, and to capitalize the difference at 8 per cent,
since the deduction from imputed income of the rent substitutes valuation according to the profitableness of the property to its present owner for the statutory standard of "full
cash value" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401), and no adequate distinction is made between imputed gross income and imputed
net incomE'.
(31] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Bstates.-The value
of leaseholds in tax exempt property located in a military
reservation and devoted solely to housing designated persons
at rents regulated by the federal government can be estimated
more accurately by capitalizing expected future actual net
income instead of an imputed income, since the income from
the possessory interests will be from subrentals and can be
ascribed entirely to the possessory estates, and since future
income can be expected to remain stable
[32] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Deductions.-In estimating the
"full cash value" of possessory estates in tax exempt property,
it is error to deduct annual "burdens," including payments
of principal and interest on mortgage debts, from annual
"benefits" and thereby compute a value that is inversely proportional to the size of mortgage debt payments, since deduction of "credits secured by mortgage or trust deed" :s contrary
to Const., art. XIII, § 1.
[33] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Possessory Estates.-In estimating the "full cash value" of possessory estates in tax
exempt property, it is error to give a present value to net
"burdens," since this assumes that annual losses expected to
be sustained in future years have a present value in the same
sense as money to be received in regular future instaUments,
and would in effect alter the property tax from a levy on the
present value of property to a tax on the net worth of
the individual taxpayer.
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[34] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The value
of a leasehold estate in tax exempt property may not be properly computed by deducting the present lessee's anticipated
annual charges to operating expenses, taxes, rent, and amortization of money invested in the leasehold, together with in• terest thereon, from anticipated annual gross income, so that
the difference, when capitalized and reduced to the "proper"
ratio of assessment to market values may be deemed the value
of the possessory interest, since deduction of amortization does
not conform either to the statutory standard of value or to
the accepted principles of capitalization.
[35] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-In assessing a leasehold estate in lands owned by the federal government, the county board of equalization should deduct from
annual gross income the annual operating and maintenance
expenses and the amount of a deposit to a replacement reserve,
it should capitalize the difference at the rate it determines
will allow for risk, interest and taxes, and the period of capitalization should be the remaining years of the lease, despite
a permissive provision for termination of the lease by the
government after a specified number of years.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San
Diego County and from orders remanding the proceedings
to the county board of equalization. L. N. Turrentine, Judge.
Reversed with directions.
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest.
for plaintiffs reversed with directions.

Judgments

James Don Keller, District Attorney and County Counsel,
Carroll H. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, Edmund G.
Brown, Attorney General, E. G. Benard and James E. Sabine,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.
Joel E. Ogle, County Counsel (Orange County), George F.
Holden and Stephen K. Tamura, Deputy County Counsel,
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Holbrook, Tan, Carter & O'Neill, W. Sumner Holbrook,
Jr., Francis H. O'Neill, Alexander W. Rutan, Robert A.
Oakes and Oakes & Horton for Respondents.
Horton & Foote, Joseph K. Horton, Rex A. McKittrick,
Lawler, Felix & Hall, Riley & Hall, Latham & Watkins,
Dana Latham, Samuel J. Nunn, Charles P. Lester, Overton,
Lyman, Prince & Vermille, Eugene Overton, Allard, Shelton
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& 0 'Connor, Irl D. Brett, Rodge L. Dolle, Read, Jacobs,
Corfman & Jacobs, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Paul, Hastings
& Janofsky, S. V. O. Prichard, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
Herbert F. Sturdy and Frank L. Mallory as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Actions to recover taxes, levied against
possessory interests in tax exempt land and improvements
and paid under protest, were brought against the county of
San Diego (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 5103, 5138) in 1953 by
De Luz Homes and in 1954 by De Luz Homes, Wire Mountain
Homes Number 1 and Wire Mountain Homes Number 2. The
county appeals from judgments in favor of plaintiffs and
from orders remanding the proceedings to the county board
of equalization. The 1953 and 1954 actions raise the same
substantive question and have been consolidated on appeal.
De Luz Homes is a 562-unit housing project located on
land owned by the United States Government at Camp Pendleton, a military installation in San Diego County. The
project provides housing for military and civilian personnel
stationed at the camp at maximum rentals prescribed by the
Federal Housing Administration and the Department of the
Navy and was constructed under the provisions of title VIII
of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1748-1748h
[known as the Wherry Act]) and section 522a of title 34
of the United States Code. Title VIII provides, "In order
to assist in relieving the acute shortage of housing which
now exists at or in areas adjacent to military installations
. . • and to increase the supply of rental housing accommodations available to military and civilian personnel at such
installations, the [Federal Housing] Commissioner is authorized . . . to insure mortgages . . • [on] property . . . designated for rent for residential use by civilian or military
personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force
. . . assigned to duty at the military installation at or in
the area of which such property is constructed." (12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1748b(a) , (b) (2) ; see Senate Report on Military and Naval
Installations-Construction, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Rep.
No. 727.) Section 522a of title 34 of the United States Code
authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to lease property under
the control of the Department of the Navy whenever it shall
be advantageous to the government.
In July, 1952, the United States Government, acting
through the Secretary of the Navy, leased a single parcel of

554

DE

Luz

HOMES, INC.

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

[45

C.2d

95.22 acres at Camp Pendleton to De Luz Homes, Inc., a
Delaware corporation, for a period of 75 years at an annual
ground rental of $100. The lease, as amended, states that
the Secretary of the Navy has determined that lease of the
premises will effectuate the purpose of "erecting, maintaining,
and operating thereon a housing project, consisting of approximately 562 units, substantially in accordance with detailed plans and specifications submitted by the Department
of the Navy .•. and approved by the Federal Housing
Commissioner." In addition to building and equipping the
project and paying the ground rental, the lessee is required
to obtain mortgage insurance from the Federal Housing
Administration, to lease the units at rents specified by the
Federal Housing Administration and the Department of the
Navy to persons designated by the commanding general of
the camp, to maintain the premises for the term of the lease,
to provide protection against fire and other losses, and to
"pay to the proper authority, when and as the same become
due and payable. all taxes, assessments, and similar charges
which, at any time during the term of this lease, may be
taxed, assessed or imposed upon the Government or upon
the Lessee with respect to or upon the leased premises." The
government promises to provide "when and as available" fire
and police protection on a nonreimbursable basis and has
reserved rights of inspection and a right of way to connect
the project with the school site adjoining it. The buildings
and other improvements erected by De Luz became the
property of the United States as they were completed, and
all ranges, refrigerators, and other items required by the
plans must remain on the premises and will become the property of the United States after the mortgage debt is paid.
Under its contract of mortgage insurance with the Federal
Housing Administration, the lessee is required to pay an
annual insurance premium, to insure the improvements against
fire and other losses, and to accumulate a fund for replacing
worn-out improvements and equipment. Under the terms of
the lease, the lessee must continue to insure and to accumulate a replacement reserve for the remainder of the lease
after the mortgage debt is paid. The lease cannot be transferred or assigned by De Luz without written approval of
the government, but may be terminated by the government
upon 60 days' notice in the event of default by De Luz in
the payment of the annual ground rental or accumulation
and maintenance of the replacement reserve, or, irrespective
of default, after 50 years from execution of the lease.
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De Luz, at its sole expense, had 562 housing units constructed
in accordance with the plans drawn by the Department of
the Navy and installed therein ranges, refrigerators, screens,
shades, and other items designated in the plans. Construction
of the entire project cost somewhat in excess of $4,516,000,
and to finance it De Luz borrowed from the Republic National
Bank of Dallas, Texas, approximately $4,600,000, at 5 per
cent per year, payable in full 30 days after completion of
the project. After the project was completed, De Luz refinanced the loan by borrowing from the First National Bank
of Boston approximately $4,516,000, at 4 per cent per year
and repayable in fixed annual installments, including interest,
of $248,388. The installment payments began on February 1,
1954, and will continue thereafter for 32 years and eight
months until 1986. To secure the loan, De Luz gave the
bank a mortgage on its leasehold interest and, as required by
its lease, purchased a mortgage insurance policy from the
Federal Housing Administration.
All net income from subrentals becomes the property of
De Luz, and the company estimates that its maximum potential gross income, assuming 100 per cent occupancy, is $552,354
per year. It forecasts, however, that after making a 20 per
cent allowance for vacancies and paying $27,967 into the
replacement reserve, $251,271 for maintenance and operating
expenses, and $248,388 in payment of its loan, it will expend
$55,238 annually in excess of income until its mortgage debt
is repaid. After 1986, however, when it will have repaid the·
loan, it expects income to exceed disbursements by $214,762
per year.! The Federal Housing Administration estimates
that at 100 per cent occupancy De Luz would receive a gross
income of $554,980 per year, and that with a 3 per cent
vacancy allowance and deductions of $156,401 for operating
expenses, $27,967 for accumulation of the replacement reserve,
and $38,400 for taxes, but without a deduction for repayment
of the loan, De Luz will receive an annual net income of
$305,862.
On Monday, July 20, 1953, after the regular assessment
period for the tax year 1953-1954 (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 405)
and during the period for equalization (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 1603), De Luz appeared by counsel before the Board of

,J

'In July, 1953, when the project was about 70 per cent completed,
De Luz predicted that maximum gross income, after a 10 per cent
vacancy allowance, would be $490,482, that disbursements would exceed
income by $35,267.08 per year until 1986, and that thereafter, with the
loan repaid, annual income would exceed expenses by $235,701.92.
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Supervisors of San Dicgo County sitting as a board of equalization. It statcd that De Luz Homes had not been assessed,
that it waived the five-day notice to which it was entitled
by statute (Rev. & 'l'ax. Code, § 1611), and that it petitioned
th~ board "to add an assessment of a possessory interest to
the De Luz Homes . . . the same being exempt property of
the United States, and the assessment to be of a possessory
interest therein with a full cash value of $40,350.00." The
assessor objected, stating that he had not been able to assess
De Luz because of insufficient information as to personal
property on the premises, that his office had delayed the
assessment to give the taxpayer sufficient time to gather
information, and that his office had "not had any cooperation from the taxpayer." The board denied the petition by
De Luz with the understanding that as soon as the assessor
obtained a full statement of personal property the entire
assessment would be put on the roll. On July 31, 1953, the
assessor entered an assessment of De Luz for the tax year
1953-1954 at a valuation of $86,690 for the possessory interest
in land, $487,380 for the possessory interest in improvements,
and $61,380 for personal property, and he levied taxes thereon
totalling $35,013.29. De Luz filed an application with the
board to reduce the assessment (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1604,
1607), and on August 24, 1953, the board held a hearing,
received oral and written evidence, and denied the application.
De Luz thereupon paid the full amount of the levy, filed a
protest contending that $29,738.57 of the tax was excessive
and void, and filed an action to recover the allegedly excessive
amount and for revaluation of its possessory interest in land
and improvements. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5138.) The court
found that the assessment had not been made during the
regular assessment period, that it was not properly an "eseape
assessment" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 531), and that it therefore
was void. The court also concluded that certain personal
property on the premises had been transferred to the United
States Government prior to the first Monday in March of
1953 and was not taxable, and that in valuing the possessory
interest in land and improvements the assessor had used an
illegal method that resulted in a constructively fraudulent
tax. The court found, however, that De Luz "expressly
waive [d] any objection to said assessment so far as said
'personal property' was concerned . . . [and] at all times
herein has conceded an equitable and moral duty to be
assessed in the sum of not more than $40,350 for said tax
year on its possessory interest in exempt land and improve-
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ments and to pay taxes in a totul sum of $1,892.68 therein."
1'he court ordered the board of equalization to reconvene, to
take new evidence of value, to recompute the value of the
possessory interest in accord with the formula offered by
De Luz, and to enter such value on the tax roll in lieu of
the value entered by the assessor, provided that no amount
less than $40,350 be entered.
During the next regular assessment period for the tax year
1954-1955, the assessor valued the possessory interest of De
Luz Homes in land at $108,909 and in improvements at
$896,518, resulting in a total valuation of $1,005,427, and
levied a tax thereon of $50,372.04. An application for reduction of the valuation and the tax thereon was filed with th0
board of equalization and denied. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1605,
1607. ) De Luz paid the tax under protest, filed a claim for
refund with the board of supervisors (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 5096), and, after its denial, filed an action in the superior
court to recover the taxes. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5103.)
Wire Mountain Homes Number 1 and Wire Mountain
Homes Number 2 also are housing units for military and
civilian personnel assigned to duty at military bases in San
Diego County, As in the case of De Luz Homes, they are
located on land leased from the federal government, were
constructed pursuant to title VIII of the National Housing
Act (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1748-1748h), were financed by loans
secured by mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration, and are subleased at rents prescribed by the
Federal Housing Administration and the Department of the
Navy. Until 1986, when the mortgage loan will have been
repaid, annual disbursements, including debt repayment, are
expected to exceed income from subrentals and thereafter
income is expected substantially to exceed disbursements.
For the tax year 1954-1955 the assessor valued the possessory
interests of the Wire Mountain projects by the same method
used for De Luz Homes. Wire Mountain Homes paid the
taxes levied on the possessory interests under protest, filed
claims for refund with the board of supervisors, and, after
the claims were denied, filed actions for recovery of the
amounts paid.
The 1954 actions by De Luz and Wire Mountain Homes
were consolidated for trial, and the court found that the
value of each of the possessory interests was zero, that the
method of valuation used by the assessor was improper, and
that the tax based on such method constituted constructive

/
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fraud. As in the 1953 action by De Luz, the court ordered
the board of equalization to reconvene, to take new evidence
of value, to recompute the value of the possessory interests
by a method specified by the court, and to order the assessor
tQ enter the new assessment on the tax roll in lieu of the
amount previously approved by the board. The court retained
jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the board and to
make such further orders. findings of fact, and judgments,
including repayment of taxes (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5141),
as might be necessary.
In the method of valuation employed by the assessor, the
fee value of the land is estimated "by the same methods
and approaches to value that [are used in assessing] all other
taxable land in the county, similarly situated and of a similar
nature." A percentage of the amount so estimated is deducted
as an allowance for restrictions on the use of the property
imposed by the lease, and to the difference, known as the base
value, is imputed an income equal to a reasonable rate of
return on the base value. In the case of De Luz, the assessor
found the reasonable rate of return to be 6 per cent, and
he added an additional 2 per cent for taxes. The percentage
representing reasonable income and taxes, known as the
"economic rental" of the leasehold, was translated into
numerieal figures from each of the leaseholds, and from it
was deducted the lessee's rent to the government, a nominal
amount of $100 reduced to $35 to allow for the ratio of assessment value to market value normally used by the assessor.
The difference between the imputed income and the rent
charged by the government, known as the lessee's "equity"
or "bonus value" in the leasehold, was capitalized at the
rate of 8 per cent for the remaining years of the lease, and
the amount so computed was deemed the present value of
the lessee's equity. A safety factor for overlooked burdens
was deducted from it, and the remaining amount was entered
on the tax roll as the value of the possessory interest in the
government-owned land. The improvements were valued in
an essentially identical manner: Their value was estimated
as if they were owned in fee; percentage deductions were
made for depreeiation and restrictions on use imposed by the
lease; an "economic rental" of 8 per cent was imputed to
the difference. Since the government charges no rent for
the improvements, the I I eeonomic rental" equaled the lessee's
"equity," and its present value, when capitalized at 8 per
cent for the remaining years of the lease and reduced by

I

Nov. 1955]

DE

Luz

HOMES, INC.

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

359

[45 C.2d 546; 290 P.2d 544]

a safety factor for undiscovered burdens, was deemed the
taxable value of the improvements.
Concluding that this method failed to take annual benefits
and burdens into account and therefore was improper, the
court directed the board of equalization to take evidence on
expected annual gross income, expected annual operating
expenses, the rate of capitalization that would allow for ad
valorem taxes, the amount of money that plaintiffs had
invested in their leaseholds, and the annual sum required to
amortize their investments together with interest thereon at
6 per cent. The board was ordered to compute the value
of the possessory interests by using actual expected net
income, rather than imputed income. It was directed to
deduct annual operating expenses and amortization from
annual gross income, to capitalize the difference for 52 years
at a rate equal to 6 per cent plus an appropriate allowance
for taxes, to reduce the amount so computed to 35 per cent
thereof to allow for the "proper" ratio of assessed value
to market value, and to enter the net result on the tax roll
as the value of the possessory interests in the leaseholds.
In addition to remanding the proceedings to the board,
the court made specific findings as to the values of the possessory interests for the tax years 1953-1954 and 1954-1955.
It found the possessory interest of De Luz to have a total
value in 1953, for both land and improvements, of $7,700,
as opposed to the assessor's total valuation of $574,070, and
in 1954 it found that each of the possessory interests had
a value of zero, as compared with estimates by the assessor
of $1,005,427 for De Luz, $112,440 for Wire Mountain Homes
Number 1, and $129,750 for Wire Mountain Homes Number 2.
In reaching these results, the court employed a method of
valuation different from that which it ordered the board to
follow. It deducted "annual burdens" (total annual disbursements, including operating expenses, payments into the
replacement reserve, and payments of principal and interest
on the mortgage debts) from "annual benefits" (annual gross
income), and found that until 1986, when the debts will have
been repaid. annual burdens will exceed annual benefits, and
that thereafter annual benefits will exceed burdens. Capitalizing the expected excess of burdens over benefits and the
expected excess of benefits over burdens over a period 8f 52
years, the court found that the capitalized value of net
burdens exceeded the capitalized value of net benefits. It
interpreted this result to mean that the present value of
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future income ftom the leaseholds was less than zero, and
that therefore the possessory interests have no value at this
time. In the case of De Luz, for example, it found that
"burdens" will exceed "benefits" by $55,238 per year until
1986, and that "benefits" will exceed "burdens" thereafter
by $214,762 per year. It computed the present value of
$55,238 per year for 32 years commencing in 1954 as
$1,043,813 and the present value of $214,762 per year for
19 years commencing in 1986 as $218,474. Subtracting the
present worth of net "benefits" from the present worth of
net "burdens," it obtained a figure of $825,339. It interpreted this figure to mean that the prescnt value of expenditures was greater than the present value of profits, and that
therefore De Luz had no taxable value at the time of assessment. The county contends that the 1953 assessment of
De Luz was timely, that the method of valuation employed
by its assessor is valid, and that the values of the leaseholds
as found by the assessor and approved by the board of equalization are correct.

Timeliness of the 1953 Assessment of De Luz Homes
[1] "If any property belonging on the local roll has
escaped assessment, the assessor shall assess the property on
discovery at its value on the lien date for the year for which
it escaped assessment •.. "
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 531.)
Thus, when property is not assessed between the first Mondays
in March and July for any tax year, the assessor is required
to assess it when he discovers its physical existence, its taxable status (see Imperial Irr. Dist. v. County of Riverside,
96 Cal.App.2d 402, 407 [215 P.2d 518]), or the fact that
it has not been assessed. (Carpenter v. Pacific Coast Ins.
Assn., 10 Ca1.2d 304, 306 [74 P.2d 511].) [2] Only if a
delayed assessment were caused by the assessor's negligence
and would cause substantial injury to the taxpayer has it
been suggested that such assessment may be improper. (See
Carpenter v. Pac·i/ic Coast Ins. Assn., supra, 10 Ca1.2d 304,
306.) In the present case, however, there is no indication
either that the assessor was negligent or that De Luz acted
to its detriment in reliance on the fact that it was not assessed
during the regular assessment period. Instead, the record
discloses that De Luz appeared before the board of equalization on the third Monday in July of 1953 and asked that it
be assessed at figures it supplied. The assessor appeared in
opposition to the petition and stated that he had insufficient
information properly to assess De Luz Homes at that time,
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that he had attempted to cooperate with the taxpayer, and
that the taxpayer had given him conflicting information about
personal property on the p.remises. The board passed a
motion authorizing the assessor to enter an assessment as
soon as he secured sufficient information. [3] It is contended that this authorization was improperly granted because
it was not preceded by five days' notice as required by section
1611 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. That section provides: "After five days succeeding the time when notice
of the date when the matter will be investigated is sent by
the clerk of the county board to all persons interested, the
county board may direct the assessor to: (a) Assess any
taxable property other than State assessed property that has
escaped assessment." When both De Luz and the assessor
appeared before the board on the third Monday in July and
argued, respectively, that an immediate assessment should be
made and that assessment should be delayed, the matter was
"investigated" within the meaning of the statute, and neither
De Luz nor the assessor can now complain that they did not
receive five days' notice of the meeting. De Luz, moreover,
specifically waived notice and requested immediate assessment at the valuations it offered. [4] Since the board could
have concluded that the assessor had not had sufficient information to make an assessment up to the time of the hearing,
and since there is no evidence that the board acted arbitrarily
or abused its discretion, its directions to the assessor cannot
be set aside. (McOlelland v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Ca1.2d
124, 129 [180 P.2d 676] ; Los Angeles etc. 00. v. Oounty of
Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 170 [121 P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 1277] ;
Utah Oonst. 00. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 655 [203 P. 401] ;
ct., Universal Oonsol. Oil 00. V. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 356, 357
[153 P.2d 746].) [5] The assessor entered his assessment
without further notice to De Luz on July 31, 1953, and since
neither the order of the board nor any statute required such
notice, and since the assessment was made in accord with
the directions of the board, it was validly entered on the
tax roll.
Pke Valuatitm ot Possessory Interests in paz
Exempt Property
[6a] The standard of valuation prescribed by the Legislature is that, "[A]ll taxable property shall be assessed at
its full cash value." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401.) "Full cash
value, " as defined in section 110 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code, "means the amount at which property would be taken
in payment of a 'just debt from a solvent debtor." (It pro-
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vides, in other words, for an assessment at the price that
property would bring to its owner if it were offered for sale
on an open market under conditions in which neither buyer
nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other.
It is a measure of desirability translated into money amounts
•
(see Brandeis, J., concurring in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Tel. 00. v. Public Service Oom., 262 U.S. 276, 310 [43
8.Ct. 544, 67 L.Ed. 981]), and might be called the market
value of property for use in its present condition. Indeed,
section 401 of the Revenue and Taxation Code as originally
enacted (Pol. Code, § 3627) contained the words "market
value" as the standard for valuation of the stock of domestic
corporations, and after "market value" was deleted in 1881
(Stats., 1881, ch. LUI, p. 57), this court stated that the
term had been synonymous with" full cash value." (Orocker
v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 585 [87 P. 102] ; see also San Francisco
Nat. Bank v. Dodge, 197 U.S. 70, 79 [25 S.Ct. 384, 49
L.Ed 669].)
[7] This standard of value must be used in the assessment
of all taxable property, for the Constitution of California
states, "All property in the State except as otherwise in this
Constitution provided, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to
be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter provided."
(Art. XIII, § 1.) [8] The Constitution requires not only
that all nonexempt property be taxed (Ohesebrough v. Oity
&- Oounty of San Francisco, 153 Cal. 559, 568-569 [96 P.
288] ; Orocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575, 585 [87 P. 102]), but
that except as otherwise specified all property be assessed
by the same standard of valuation. (Mahoney v. Oity of San
Diego, 198 Cal. 388, 398, 403 [245 P. 189] ; Wilson v. Oounty
of Sutter, 47 Cal. 91, 92 [construing substantially similar provision in Const. 1848, art. XI, § 13].) Thus, it was held
reversible error for a board of equalization to value one type
of property at the price it would bring as salvage while
valuing other property at the price it would bring in its
present use and condition. (Mahoney v. Oity of San Diego,
supra, 198 Cal. 388, 400-402.)
[9] Since nonexempt possessory interests in land and
improvements, such as the leasehold estates involved in the
present actions,2 are taxable property (Rev. & Tax. Code,
·The possessory interest is admittedly taxable in the hands of the
present lessees, and would be taxable even if they defaulted and the
leaseholds were assumed by the Federal Housing Commissioner. (12
U.S.C.A. t 17481.)
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§§ 201, 104, 107; Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd,
43 Ca1.2d 157, 164 [272 P.2d 16]; Km:ser Co. v. Reid, 30
Ca1.2d 610, 618 [184 P.2d 8J9]; see Delaney v. Lowrey, 25
Ca1.2d 561, 564 [154 P.2d 674]), they too must be assessed
at "full cash value." [10] In practice, assessors usually
enter the entire value of land and improvements on the tax
roll without distinction between possessory and reversionary
interests, and since this practice results in a single amount
reflecting both interests on the roll, the constitutional mandate
that all property be taxed is obeyed. (San Pedro, etc. R. R.
00. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 22 [179 P. 393].)
[11] As between reversioners and possessors payment of the
tax is a private arrangement. (S·imms v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 303, 313 [217 P.2d 936] ; San Pedro, etc. R. R.
00. v. Oity of Los Angeles, s-upra, 180 Cal. 18, 22; Lick v.
Austin, 43 Cal. 590, 594-596.) [12] When, however, the possessory interest is taxable and the reversion is exempt, only the
possessory interest is subject to assessment and taxation.
(Pasadena v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 171, 176 [187 P.
418]; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645, 661.) "When . . .
there is a lease of land owned by the state or a municipality,
the reversion being exempt from taxation, the usufructuary
interest alone is subject to tax in proportion to its value;
and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the tax
necessarily falls upon the lessee." (Hammond Lbr. 00. v.
Oounty of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235, 240 [285 P. 896].)
[13] Since the possessory interest must be assessed in
accord with the standard of valuation applicable to all other
property, its estimated value is the price it would bring if
offered on an open market under conditions in which neither
buyer nor seller could take advantage of the exigencies of
the other, and this hypothetical market price is its value
even though a sale of the property has not been made or
contemplated. [14] It is well settled that "the absence
of an 'actual market' for a particular type of property does
not mean that it has no value or that it may escape from
the constitutional mandate that 'all property • • . shall be
taxed in proportion to its value' (Art. XIII, § 1) but only
that the assessor must then use such pertinent factors as
replacement costs and income analyses for determining 'valuation.'" (Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 623 [184
P.2d 879].)
•
[15] Assessors generally estimate value by analyzing
market data on sales of similar property, replacement costs,
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and income from the property (see 1 Bonbright, Valuation
of Property, pp. 113-2G6; Amcrican Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate, pp. 75-85; Fisher,
Real Estate in California, p. 157), and since no one of these
met)lOds alone can be used to estimate the value of all property, the assessor, subject to requirements of fairness and
uniformity, may exercise his discretion in using one or more
of them. (Utah Oonst. 00. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649,
652-653 [203 P. 401] ; Southern Calif. Tel. Co. v. Oounty of
Los Angeles, 45 Cal.App.2d 111, 116-118 [113 P.2d 773].)
[16] The assessing authority's estimate of the value of specific
property at a specific time is reviewed by the board of equalization at the request of the taxpayer (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 1601-1615), and the board's decision in regard to specific
valuations and the methods of valuation employed are equivalent to the findings and judgment of a trial court and reviewable only for arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or failure to
follow the standards prescribed by the Legislature. (McClelland v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 30 Cal.2d 124, 129;
Universal Consolo Oil 00. v_ Byram, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 356;
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Richardson, 182 Cal. 115, 128 [187 P.
411] ; Los Angeles etc. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra,
162 Cal. 164, 168.)
[17] In the present case, the assessor purported to value
the leaseholds by the capitalization of income method, a gencrally accepted method of valuing property from which income
may be or is derived. (Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610, 623
[184 P.2d 879]; Pullman 00. v. Richardson, 185 Cal. 484,
496 [197 P. 346]; Alpaugh Irr. DiBt. v. Oounty of Kern,
113 Cal.App.2d 286, 293 [248 P.2d 117]; Birch v. Oounty
of Orange, 59 Cal.App. 133, 138 [210 P. 57] ; H. & W. P·ierce,
Inc. V. O(Junty of Santa Barbara, 40 Cal.App. 302,306 [180 P.
641] ; see Wild Goose C. Club v. County of Butte, 60 Cal.
App. 339, 341 [212 P. 711].) According to this method,
the value of property is the sum of anticipated future
installments of net income from the property, less an allowance for interest and the risk of partial or no receipt. (See
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal
of Real Estate, chs. 17, 18; Babcock, The Valuation of Real
Estate, pp. 39, 127-129; 1 Bonbright, The Valuation of Property, ch. XI.) "[I]t involves a capitalization or discounted
valuation of the realized or prospective net monetary income
derivable by continuous exploitation rather than by resale."
(1 Bonbright, op. cit. supra, p. 230.) [18] The first step in
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the process is to determine prospective net income and this
is done by estimating future gross income and deducting
therefrom expected necessary, expenses incident to maintenance and operation of the property. In instances ill
which future income cannot be estimated with reasonable
accuracy or is not ascribable entirely to the property, pros.
pective net monetary income is imputed in an amount equal
to a minimum reasonable return on estimated market value.
(See Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 623 [184 P.2d 879].)
[19] Since it is generally accepted that a person who agrees
to receive payment in the future is entitled to interest both
for waiting and the risk of partial or no receipt, the second
step is to discount each future installment of income by a
rate of interest that takes into account the hazards of the
investment and the accepted concepts of a "fair return."
The sum of the discounted installments is the present value
of the property.8 An apt example of determining the value
of property by the capitalization of net income method is
given by counsel in a companion case: Assume that the most
effective use that may be made of an item of property is
the rental thereof, that the property may be rented for a
period of three years (at the end of which it will be worthless)
for a gross rental of $120 a year, to be paid at the end of
the year, that the expenses, e.g., repairs, of the lessor incident
to the property will be $20 a year, also to be paid at the
end of the year, and that a 6 per cent rate of return is
appropriate to the amount of risk involved to the lessor.
The value of the property will be determined as follows:
Annual gross income ...........•..•..•.•.••.... $120.00
Annual expense ............••••••••.••••••.. 20.00
Annual net income ......•.•..•••••..... $100.00
Present worth of $100 to be received:
1 year in the future ($100 x .9434)4 ... $94.34
2 years in the future ($100 x .89)4 .... 89.00
3 years in the future ($100 x .8396) 4.. 83.96
Value of property ...................... $267.30
-:In practice, the present value of an amount to be received in regular
future installments is computed by multiplying the annual amount by
a present value factor that reflects interest, risk, and, if applicable, a
decline in income in later years. (See American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate. Appendix, tables I·IX;
Finney, Principles of Accounting, [3d ed.] ch. 10; Schmutz, Co'hdemna·
tion Appraisal Handbook, ch. 9.)
6The coefficients for a 6 per cent return were taken from a standard
discount table printed in Babcock, Valuation of Real Estate, p. 538.
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[6b] In valuing property, the assessor must adhere to
the statutory standard of "full cash value," and must therefore estimate the price the property would bring on an open
market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller
co~d take advantage of the exigencies of the other. [20] The
net earnings to be capitalized, therefore, are not those of the
present owner of the property, but those that would be anticipated by a prospective purchaser. "Anticipated future earning power is the sole matter of consequence, since reported
earnings are already water under the mill." (Bonbright,
OPe cit. supra, p. 229; see also Babcock, OPe cit. supra, pp.
229-230.) The present owner may have invested well or
poorly, may have contracted to pay very high or very low
rent, and may have built expensive improvements or none
at all. To value property by capitalizing his anticipated net
earnings would make the value of property equal to the
present value of his profits; since, however, the legislative
standard of value is "full cash value," it is clear that whatever may be the rationale of the property tax, it is not the
profitableness of property to its present owner. If a purchaser would buy a given property on an open market, the
property has a value equal to the price such purchaser might
be expected to pay.
[21] The standard of "full cash value" applies equally
to a leasehold interest. Accordingly, the assessor must estimate the price a leasehold would bring on an open market
under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller could take
advantage of the exigencies of the other. He must therefore
capitalize, not the anticipated net earnings of the present lessee, but those of a prospective assignee. [22] To a prospective
assignee, anticipated net earnings equal expected gross income
less necessary expenditures for maintenance, operation, and
taxes. G No deduction is made for the cost of the lease to
the present lessee, i.e., his charges for rent and amortization
of improvements, for to a prospective assignee the value of
a leasehold is measured solely by anticipated gross income
less expected necessary expenditures.
[23] In Blinn Lbr. 00. V. Oounty of Los Angeles, 216
Cal. 474, 481 [14 P.2d 512], this court stated that a person
•Although taxes are themselves based on value, the tax rate is known.
and therefore an allowance for taxes can be expressed as a percentage
of the value to be found. In practice, an allowance for taxes is usually
made as an addition to the capitalization rate and is reflected in the
present worth factor. (See 1 Bonbright, The ValaatiOIl of PropezV.
p. 257.)
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who has assumed a lease will deduct from his annual income
statement an aliquot portion of the price he paid to acquire
the lease and of the cost of improvements that he installed.
Such practice is in accord with generally accepted principles
of accounting to determine the net income and net worth
of the present owner. (See Finney, OPe cit. supra, chs. 11,
12.) By allocating past costs to present and future income,
the income recipient apportions expenditures for long-term
benefits to each revenue period in which some of the benefit
is realized. The remaining unamortized cost appears on the
balance sheet as an asset valued at cost less the amounts
already charged to income. (See Finney, Ope cit. supra,
pp. 192, 207; 2 Bonbright, OPe cit. supra, p. 894 et seq.)
Although this procedure is sound accounting practice to
determine the net income and net. worth of the present owner,
it will not reflect the "full cash value" of the property. The
accountant deals with past historical cost to the present owner
and by the process of amortization spreads the cost of property
over its useful life. (Babcock, OPe cit. supra, pp. 402-403.)
The unamortized cost reflected on the balance sheet has no
relation to the "full cash value," i.e., the price that a willing
buyer would pay a willing seller.
[24] Furthermore, in determining the income to be capitalized to establish value for appraisal purposes, no deduction
can be made for amortization. (Fisher, Nature of Capital
and Income, pp. 238, 255.) "[N]o concept of income which
includes . . • depreciation in capital value as a positive or
negative item of income, is acceptable as a basis of valuation
under the 'capitalized-income' method." (Bonbright, OPe
cit. supra, p. 910 citing Fisher.) "[I]n valuation, net earnings are net 'before depreciation,' i.e., net earnings are a
combination of income and capital returns and are c·omputed
as the actual difference between the 'puts' and 'takes.' Appraising presupposes a purchaser, and the valuation is made
at a figure which the net earnings can support including a
return of capital equal to the successive losses of value
expected in the depreciation of the property. Since the value
is the end and object of valuation, the process cannot include
an expense item based upon the answer." (Babcock, Ope cit.
supra, p. 420.) [25] Rent paid for a leasehold interest,
like the cost of improvements that revert to the le.ssor, is
part of the cost or purchase price of the leasehold, and to
include a deduction for it, is likewise to include an item of
expense based on the answer, i.e., the value of the property.
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Thus, it would not only be anomalous to deduct any part of
that value, the very answer sought, from the income that is
to be capitalized to obtain that answer, it would be a duplication, for the interest rate applied in capitalizing net income
provides for a return of capital value as well as interest.
(American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal
of Real Estate, p. 321; ibid., p. 214; Babcock, op. cit. supra •.
p. 230; see example given below. 6 )
[26a] It is apparent. therefore, that in requiring the assessor to deduct the present lessee's charges for rent and
amortization from estimated gross income the court in the
Blinn case confused income for accounting" purposes with income for appraisal purposes. 6 [27] Moreover, there will be
no "waste of capital" as feared by the court in the Blinn case
(216 Cal. at 478) when the purchaser's cost equals the capitaJ
value of the property. 'I If the cost exceeds this value, then
there is a wastage of capital, but only at the time of purchase
and it is properly disregarded by persons valuing property
in terms of future income.
To deduct amortization charges of the present lessee
not only is to subtract a part of the very figure that is being
determined, the value of the property, from the elements of
the computation, but is to reach a valuation of zero in every
4The Blinn case also eITed in ordering that actual rent and amortization be deducted from imputed gross income without making an
adequate distinction between imputed gross and imputed net income_ An
lmputed gross income must be sufficiently large to allow for expenditures
and therefore must exceed the minimum reasonable return on an invest
ment. The court in Blinn. howe\'er. deducted actual rental and amortization charges from an imputed gross income of 6 per cent of the fee
value of the leased land, and also used 6 per cent as the rate of capitalization. (216 Cal. at p_ 479.) It can hardly be assumed, however, that
the same percentage that reasonably reflected the risk and interest
incident to capitalizing net income was sufficient to serve as a basis for
the deduction of the lessee's charges_
'That this capital value will be restored to the purchaser through
operation of the capitalization of income method may be demonstrated
by continuing the example above, p, 593, If a purchaser buys the
property for the capitalized value of $267,30, he will receive each year
a return of capital and interest as follows:
Net
Interest at 6 Per Cent Annual Partial
Amount Unrecovered Capita) Return of Capita.!
Year Rec'd
Valu..
Value
1st
$100 $16.04 ($267.30x.06) $83.% ( $1:-::0-=-0--=-16-=-.0-=-4")
2d
100
11.00 (183.:-J4x.06)
89.00 ( 100-11.00)
3d
100
5.66 ( 94.34x.06)
94.34 ( 100- 5.66)
Total capita.! value returned $267.30

Amount of Capita.!
Va.!ue Unrecovered a.
End of Year
$183.34 ($267.30-83.96)
94_34 ( 183_34-89.00)
o ( 94_34-94.34)

Thus, the value determined by applying the capitalization rate to (tet
income, exclusive of amortization, results in no waste of capital, for
the annual net receipts result in a complete return of the original capital
of $267.30 plus interest at the rute of 0 per cent on the unrecovered value
r('mainin~ at thp end ot each year.
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case in which the lessee had estimated future earnings correctly and had invested their present value in the leasehold. s
Under such circumstances, ..the lessee, although paying no
property taxes would recover the full amount of his investment plus interest over the life of the lease (see example,
supra). Thus, in the case of De Luz, the Federal Housing
Administration estimates ~hat annual net income, after deducting operating expenses, the required contribution to the
replacement reserve, and taxes, will be $305,862 per year.
The present value of the right to receive that amount for
the period of the lease, 75 years, is $5,033,255, when capitalized at 6 per cent. If, however, an annual deduction of
$274,279 is made from gross income to allow for recoupment
of the lessee's investment at 6 per cent,9 ann~al income is
but $31,583 per year, with a present value of $393,555.
According to the estimates of De Luz, annual net income,
except for amortization of its investment and taxes, will
be $162,645 per year, which has a present value of $2,026,719
at 8 per cent. If amorization is deducted, the net income
is a negative figure, and the leasehold has a value of zero.
There is no doubt, however, that the right to receive $162,645
per year for 75 years has a value equal to the sum of the
amounts to be received less a discount for risk and interest.
De Luz invested approximately $4,516,000 to receive the annual income from the lease, and in reliance on its receipt the
First National Bank of Boston loaned the principal of the
investment and the Federal Housing Administration insured
the loan. In the light of these facts, to hold that the leasehold
has a value of zero would require a unique concept of value for
purposes of taxation entirely different from that used in the
ordinary course of business. [26b] Statements in the Blinn
~hus. using the fiy-ures of the previous example, a deduction for
amortization of the investment in the property in estimating future net
income gives the following absurd result:
"A.nnual income ..................••••••••••...... 1120.00
Annual expense
"(a) Repairs ...........•.••••.•.•••..• 20
(b) Amortization of cost in equal annual
payments over 3 years with 6% interest on unrecovered cost ...•.••••. 100

"Net income to be capitalized .............•..••..... $000.00
Value determined by capitalization of income ........ tOOO.OO"
•
'The amount is predicated on the compound interest, equal yearly installments, and declining income assumptions of the Inwood Coefficient.
(See American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal of
Beal Estate, Appendi.%, Table III.)
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cases (216 Cal. 474, 478-482; 216 Cal. 468, 472-473) requiring
the assessing authorities to deduct the present lessee's charges
to rent and amortization from expected gross income when
valuing possessory interests by an analysis of anticipated
ear.ning power are therefore disapproved. 10
[28] It is contended that the value of the leaseholds, when
no deduction from income is made for amortization and rent,
will approach the estimated fee values of the land and im- .
provements. Since it is conceivable that the" full cash value"
of a long-term possessory interest may approach the value·
of the fee, near equality between the two estimated values
would not of itself demonstrate invalidity in the valuation
of either one. [29] Nor does near equality of the leasehold
values to those of the fee constitute a violation of the immunity of the federal government from taxation by the states.
Since the tax is imposed solely on the privately owned possessory interest of the lessee. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 201, 104,
107), and under the terms of the contract between the federal
government and the lessee will be paid entirely by the lessee
(see also 12 U.S.O.A. § 1748f), neither its legal nor economi<!
incidence falls on the federal government. (See Wilson v.
Cook, 327 U.S. 474. 483 f66 8. Ct. 663, 90 L.Ed. 793) ; S.R.A.
Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569 [66 8.Ct. 749. 90 L.Ed.
851] ; Oklahoma Tax Com. v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 364
[69 8.0t. 561, 93 L.Ed. 721]; Alabama v. King & Boozer,
314 U.S. 1, 9-14 [62 8.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R 615] ;
cf. Society for Savings in Cleveland v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143
f75 S.Ct. 607, 610, 99 L.Ed. 950].)
[30] In determining the value of the leasehold, the assessor
imputed an income of 6 per cent and taxes of 2 per cent to
an amount somewhat less than the estimated fee value of the
land and improvements, deducted the $100 rent paid to the
government therefrom. and capitalized the difference at 8 per
cent. This method is erroneous in several respects. First.
the deduction from imputed income of the $100 rent paid to
the government substitutes valuation according to the profit.
ableness of the property to its present owner for the statutory
lOIn Hammond Lbr. Co. v. County of Los Angetes, 104 Cal.App. 235
1'285 P. 8961, the District Court of Appeal, in affirming a judgment
denying recovery of taxes on a possessory interest, explained a method
of valuation that deducted the lessee's rent from imputed gross income
and that was presented in evidence to the county board of supervisors
by the assessing authorities. (104 Cal.App. at p. 244.) That method
did not control the decision of the court in the Hammond case (sce
especially 104 Cal.App. at p. 246), and it should not be inferred that it
now controls assessing authorities.
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standard of "full cash value." As pointed out above, the
price that a leasehold would command on an open market
under conditions in which q.either buyer nor seller could takt>
advantage of the exigencies of the other is based on expected
future net income from the leasehold without regard to rent
paid by the present lessee. Second, no adequate distinction is
made between imputed gross income and imputed net income.
An imputed gross income would have to be sufficiently large
to allow for deduction of anticipated necessary expenses incident to operating and maintaining the project, but no deduction for these items, either actual or imputed. is made.
Imputed net income would equal the minimum reasonable
return on the investment, but the assessor's method deducts
the $100 rent to be paid the government, and thereby reduces imputed income to a rate of return less than the rate
of capitalization.
[81] The value of the leaseholds involved in the present
case can be estimated more accurately by capitalizing expected future actual net income instead of an imputed income.
According to the imputed income analysis used by the assessor, the value of the leaseholds was deemed to be equal to
the present value of an income imputed to the "base value"
of the leaseholds, the "base value" being equal to the estimated value of the fee less a deduction for "burdens and
restrictions of the lease." The initial step in the computation, an estimation of the fee value of the land and improvements "by the same methods and approaches to value that
[are used in assessing] all other taxable land in the county.
similarly situated and of a similar nature," necessitates an
assumption that land and improvements located in a military
installation and devoted solely to housing designated persons
at rents regulated by the government can be said to be
., similarly situated and of a similar nature" to privately
owned lands and improvements in the county, even thougb
great differences exist in geographic location, expected stability of income, and the range of uses for which the properties
are available. The second step in the assessor's computation
was to deduct a "restriction percentage for limitations on the
use prescribed by the lease, " tbe amount" depending upon the
burdens and restrictions of the lease," but there is no indication either that the percentage deducted is an adequate or
proper measure of such limitations, or that the lease in fact
imposee. any burdens on the fee, for it is doubtful that the
land would promise the substantial income that it now does
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were it not for the assurance of continued occupancy by
military personnel provided by the lease. (See Meade Heights,
[nc. v. State Tax Com. of Md., 202 Mo. 20, 31 [95 A.2d 280].)
After deducting an allowance for limitations, the assessor
imyuted an income of6 per cent to the remainder, but it is
not at all clear that actual anticipated income less expenses
will approximate such imputed income. Moreover, to obtain
the present value of the imputed income, the assessor capitalized the income at a rate of 8 per cent. The capitalization
rate is supposed to reflect risk and interest attributable to
the particular investment to which it is applied (see 1 Bonbright, The Valuation of Property, pp. 259-264), but the assessor's rate appears to measure, not the risk and interest
attributable to the investment at bar, but that attributable
to an. income hypothetically imputed to a "base value." In
summation, the assessor's valuation of the leaseholds is predicated on tlle assumption that a certain percentage of an
amount somewhat less than the fee value, when capitalized
at an abstractly reasonable rate, equals the value of the possessory interest. In some cases this assumption may have
to be made, and we do not condemn all estimates of value
based on capitalization of an imputed income. In valuing
property wherein actual income is derived in large part from
enterprise activity and cannot be ascribed el!tirely to the use
of the property, an imputed income analysis may be both
useful and appropriate. In the present actions, however,
the income from the possessory interests will be from subrentals and can be ascribed entirely to the possessory estates.
Moreover, future income can be expected to remain stable,
for rents are controlled in amount by the Federal Housing
Administration and the Department of the Navy and occupancy is assured by the fact that the project is located on
a military installation that is "deemed to be a permanent part
of the Military Establishment." (12 U.S.C.A. § 1748b(b) (2).)
Expected annual expenditures have been estimated by both
the Federal Housing Administration and the lessees and therefore carefully formulated evidence as to anticipated expenses
is available to the assessing authorities. Under these circum.
stances, the value of plaintiff's possessory interests can best
be estimated in terms of actual income rather than imputed
income. (See Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 185 Cal. 484, 496
r197 P. 346] ; Alpaugh Irr. Dist. v. (Jounty of Kern, 113 Cal.
App.2d 286, 293 [248 P.2d 117] ; Birch v. County of Orange,
59 Cal.App. 133, 138 [210 P. 57]; H. &- W. Pierce, Inc. v.
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Oounty of Santa Barbara, 40 Cal.App. 302, 306 [180 P. 641J ;
lVild Goose C. (Jlub v. County of Butte, 60 Cal.App. 339, 341
[212 P. 711].)
Although the trial court employed methods of actual
income analysis both in its findings and in its order of remand, we have concluded that both of the court's methods
are improper for estimating the "full cash value" of possessory estates. [32] In its findings the court deducted annual
"burdens," including payments of principal and interest on
the mortgage debts, from annual "benefits," and thereby
computed a value that was inversely proportional to the
size of mortgage debt payments. Since deduction of "credits
secured by mortgage or trust deed" is contrary to section 1
of article XIII of the California Constitution and to well
established decisions of this court (Lick v. Austin, 43 Cal.
590, 594; Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Ca1.2d 637, 643 [192 P.2d 5] ;
cf. Henne v. Los Angeles County, 129 Cal. 297, 298 [61 P.
1081] [decided before repeal in 1910 of former section 4 of
article XIII), the method is erroneous. [33] Moreover, in
stating that net "burdens" have a present value, the court
assumed that annual losses expected to be sustained in future
years have a present value in the same sense as money to be
received in regular future installments, and it also assumed
that such present value may be used in valuing possessory interests for purposes of taxation. Although the assumption that
future losses have a present value could rest on the theory
that a sum of money invested at present to provide for the
payment of expected losses might be termed their present
value, a property valuation computed in the manner illustrated by the court's findings and resting on the court's assumptions would in effect alter the property tax from a levy
on the present value of property to a tax on the net worth of
the individual taxpayer. [34] Plaintiffs, however, do not rely
on the method used in the court's findings, but contend that
the method outlined in the order of remand is controlling. According to this method, the present lessee's anticipated annual
charges to operating expenses, taxes, rent, and amortization
of money invested in the leasehold together with interest
thereon are deducted from anticipated annual gross income.
The difference, when capitalized and reduced to the "proper"
ratio of assessment to market values, is deemed the v~lue of
the possessory interest. The error of this method is that deduction of amortization does not conform either to the statutory standard of value or to the accepted principles of capitalization heretofore discussed.
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[35] The proceedings must be remanded to the county
board of equalization for determination of the value of the possessory interests and the taxes thereon. (Universal ComoZ. Oil,
00. v. Byram, 25 Ca1.2d 353, 362-363 [153 P.2d 746].) The
board shall take evidence on annual anticipated gross income,
operating and maintenance expenses, the amount required
to be deposited in the replacement reserve, and the percentage
that will adquately allow for taxes. Moreover, since the rate
of capitalization is predicated on the risk, interest, and provisions for replacement of capital relative to the investment
to which it is applied (see 1 Bonbright, op. cit. supra, pp.
259-262), the board shall take evidence on these matters and
ascertain therefrom the proper rate of capitalization. It shall
deduct annual operating and maintenance expenses and the
deposit to the replacement reserve from annual gross income,
and shall capitalize the difference at the rate that it determines will allow for risk, interest, and taxes. The period of
capitalization shall be the remaining years of the lease, for
although the government is authorized to terminate the leases
at the end of 50 years, the terms of the leases and the statute
under which they were drawn (see especially 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1748b (b) (2» clearly contemplate that the leases will exist
for their full terms. (Kaiser 00. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 620
[184 P.2d 879].)
The judgments and orders are reversed with directions
to the trial court to remand the proceedings to the county
board of equalization for action in accord with this opinion.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied December
21, 1955.
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